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PRICE DISCRIMINATION: TERRITORIAL PRICING
FOR CABLE TELEVISION SERVICES AND THE
MEETING COMPETITION DEFENSE UNDER THE
CABLE TELEVISION CONSUMER PROTECTION
AND COMPETITION ACT OF 1992
DONALD L. BELL, EsQ.*
On October 5, 1992 Congress voted to override a Presidential veto and the
1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection And Competition Act' became law.
Buried in the Act amidst a host of other requirements is a little noticed provision
that forbids price differences. 2 On its face, the uniform pricing or "price dis-
crimination" provision would not allow a cable operator to maintain different
prices in response to different competitive conditions.
This article explains how a price discrimination provision came to be included
in the Act. It then explains in general terms the economic and legal theories of
price discrimination. With that background in place, the article discusses how
the courts might interpret the new price discrimination provision, with particular
attention to the need for a "meeting competition defense." Finally, the article
offers some thoughts on the practical implications this provision holds for cable
operators, municipal franchising authorities and consumers.
I. HISTORY
Since 1984, when the Cable Communications Policy Act3 became law, mu-
nicipal franchising authorities have expressed concern over the absence of com-
petition in the market for cable services. 4 These concerns have been based on the
widespread perception that in the absence of either price regulation or direct
competition cable operators have been charging monopoly rates for their services.'
Because in most cases the '84 Cable Act forbade regulation of rates, 6
municipalities sometimes encouraged entry by a second cable operator in the
* B.S., Florida State University, 1975; M.S., 1979; J.D., 1989; currently associated with Foley
& Lardner specializing in antitrust and cable television practice.
I. The Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat.
1460 (1992)(to be codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. §§ 521 et. seq.) (hereinafter '92 Cable
Act).
2. Section 3 of the new '92 Act states:
(d) Uniform Rate Structure Required. - A cable operator shall have a rate structure,
for the provision of cable service, that is uniform throughout the geographic area in
which cable service is provided over its cable system.
3. The Cable Communications Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984)(codified
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611) [hereinafter '84 Cable Act].
4. See, e.g., The Oversight of The 1984 Cable Telecommunications Act: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 187 (Nov. 16, 1989) [hereinafter Senate Comm. Hearings](statement of James
Sharpe, Mayor, City of Newark, N.J., on behalf of the Nat'l League of Cities and the United States
Conference of Mayors).
5. Id.
6. See 47 U.S.C. § 543.
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belief that fostering direct competition between cable operators will control cable
prices.7 These efforts to introduce competition have occurred in spite of strong
evidence that direct competition between cable operators cannot be sustained.'
After exploring alternatives and finding that they cannot directly regulate
cable rates, 9 some communities have decided that their only option is to encourage
a competitor to enter the market in the hope that competition would force the
incumbent cable operator to reduce rates.' 0
Few companies have been willing to respond to these municipal invitations
by entering into direct competition against incumbent operators." However, in
the belief that they could secure a customer base by charging lower rates than
the incumbent operator, some companies have taken on the challenge. 2 Where
this has occurred the results have usually been highly unsatisfactory.'3
One result has been that the newly entering competitors, often referred to
as "overbuilders" because they overbuild an existing system, 14 typically, choose
not to construct a system that extends over the entire area being served by the
7. See, e.g., Cable Alabama Corporation v. City of Huntsville, 768 F.Supp. 1484 (N.D. Ala.
1991), discussing the extreme measures taken by the city of Huntsville, Alabama not only to encourage,
but to compel, direct competition between cable operators.
8. The most comprehensive report produced to date on the subject of direct competition between
cable operators reported that "[nlo long term benefits will occur because competition is not likely
to be sustained." Touche Ross, Metro Dade Report on Overlapping Cable Franchises, 1 (Oct. 1987)
[hereinafter "Metro Dade Report"]
9. Section 543(a) of the '84 Cable Act prohibited all regulation of rates. 47 U.S.C. § 543.
Section 3 of the '92 Cable Act eliminates that prohibition and restores some rate regulating authority.
§ 3 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 543). It remains to be seen whether or not this change will relieve some
of the pressure to introduce competition.
10. While the '92 Cable Act contains provisions that authorize rate regulation by local franchising
authorities under certain circumstances and these provisions may diminish the perceived need for
competition in some communities, other provisions of the Act are likely to lead to rate increases
which may in turn create the perception that rate regulation is a failure. See e.g., § 6, '92 Cable Act
(amending 47 U.S.C. § 325 to provide for retransmission consent). This may fuel the demand for
direct competition. Similarly, in the hope of gaining a new income stream to replace declining
revenues from other sources, some municipalities are electing to build their own systems and go into
competition with incumbent cable operators themselves. Thus, there is likely to be an increase in
direct competition between cable operators rather than a decrease.
11. Most operators recognize that cable's natural monopoly characteristics preclude direct com-
petition between cable service providers. See Alfred Kahn, 2 The Economics of Regulation: Principles
and Institutions 34 (197 l)("[a] CATV system is itself a natural monopolist, within any given geographic
region, subject to the familiar increasing returns with increasing intensity of use; it would obviously
be inefficient to have more than one antenna and system of cables."); Omega Satellite Products Co.
v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d. 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982)("The cost of the cable grid appears to
be the biggest cost of a cable television system and to be largely invariant to the number of subscribers
the system has. We said earlier that once the grid is in place-once every major street has a cable
running above or below it that can be hooked up to the individual residences along the street-the
cost of adding another subscriber probably is small. If so, the average cost of cable television would
be minimized by having a single company in any geographic area; for if there is more than one
company and therefore more than one grid, the cost of each grid will be spread over a smaller
number of subscribers, and the average cost per subscriber, and hence price will be higher").
12. The leading example of such a company is Telesat Cablevision, Inc., which has been described
as "the most aggressive overbuilder in the country," Thomas W. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition
in Cable Television: Implications For Public Policy, 7 YALE J.. ON REG. 65, 92 (1990), and which
has overbuilt a number of Florida cable television markets.
13. The Metro Dade Report found that as of 1987, 80% of the overbuild systems authorized
were either not constructed or had been terminated. Metro Dade Report, supra note 8 at 45.
14. Donald L. Bell, Unbundling: An Alternative To the Current System of Cable Television
Franchising, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 43, 58 n.77 (1991).
1992 Cable TV Act
incumbent operator. Instead, they choose to build only a small system that
overlaps some portion of the incumbent operator's territory," where they charge
prices lower than the incumbent. As expected, the incumbent operator reduces
prices in response to the new competition. However, the incumbent operator
usually extends price reductions only to those areas where the new competitor
builds a system. The result is that the incumbent maintains a two-tiered territorial
pricing policy under which customers in non-competitive areas pay higher prices
for cable services than customers in competitive areas.
In most situations, these price differences have resulted in complaints from
the overbuilder that the incumbent is engaged in anti-competitive "price
discrimination' '1 6 and complaints from consumers who pay the higher rate that
the incumbent is treating them unfairly. 7 Consequently, it is not surprising that
cable operators' territorial pricing policies have often fallen into disfavor with
municipal officials who may wrongly perceive that these policies inhibit compe-
tition." It was in response to these complaints that Congress enacted section
623(d) of the '92 Cable Act.
II. OTHER RELEVANT STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
In the 1930's because it feared that large economically powerful chain stores
would use their purchasing power to compel supplier discounts, thereby driving
small retailers out of business, Congress passed legislation which under certain
circumstances outlaws differences in price.19 The Clayton Act provides in relevant
part that:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce .. .to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ...
and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.2-
Because it was intended to prevent misconduct by retail chains, the Clayton
Act extends only to sales of commodities. 2 Early Court decisions addressing the
15. The overbuilder will typically target high density areas where residents have a relatively high
average income that can be spent on cable services. This is often referred to as a "cherry-picking"
strategy. Id. at 67 n. 110.
16. See, e.g., Susan G. Strother, County Would Restrict Cable-TV Rates, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
C-1, C-6 (Aug. 22, 1989)(Harry Cushing, President of Telesat Cablevision, Inc., an overbuilder,
complains that through a proposed County ordinance "appears to put the County's stamp [of
approval] on price discrimination.").
17. See, e.g., Hearing Set on Cable-TV Rates, ORLANDO SENTINEL, C-I, C-6 (April 18, 1989)
(discussing complaints by local Orange County, Florida cable subscribers that "their rates are nearly
twice those of other homeowners who live only a block away").
18. Because of cable's natural monopol characteristics direct competition between cable operators
probably cannot be sustained. See supra note 11. Because direct competition cannot exist under
natural monopoly conditions, perceptions that price discrimination inhibits competition are misplaced.
In fact, when competition does develop, territorial pricing may be the only viable means by which
an incumbent cable operator can compete. See infra note 83.
19. Clayton Act § 2(b), 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat.
1526 (1936), (Current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)(1973)) [hereinafter "Clayton Act"]
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Export Liquor Sales, Inc. v. Ammex Warehouse Co., 426 F.2d 251 (6th Cir.
1993]
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issue concluded that cable television involves the sale of a service rather than a
commodity. Thus, for reasons unrelated to any determination of whether terri-
torial pricing policies are economically or morally offensive, the Clayton Act
does not apply to the delivery of cable television services. 22 However, as will be
seen, the Clayton Act is still important to any discussion of price discrimination
in cable markets.
The fact that the Clayton Act does not directly apply to cable television has
not left pricing for cable services free of all legal scrutiny. 23 There are numerous
State statutes modeled after the Clayton Act that do extend to price discrimination
in service markets. Thus cable television is within the scope of some of those
statutes. 24 Furthermore, in order to eliminate a perceived competitive imbalance
between incumbent cable operators and newly entering competitors, municipalities
have sometimes passed ordinances that specifically target the territorial pricing
policies of incumbent cable operators. 25 However, as previously noted, the '84
Cable Act prohibited rate regulation. The Act also contained a strong preemption
provision which made the legitimacy of State and local price discrimination
ordinances questionable under Federal law. For these reasons, and perhaps
because of some doubts about the economic implications involved, even when
they have passed cable pricing ordinances few local officials have actually been
willing to apply them to cable operators.
Section 623(d) of the '92 Cable Act, which is very similar to, and was
perhaps modeled after, some local ordinances, represents an effort by Congress
to prohibit cable operators from using price discrimination as an anti-competitive
tool. 26 However, the question remains: How should section 623(d) be applied in
particular situations? If the court's apply it only to anti-competitive behavior
then it will serve a valuable purpose. If it used to prohibit legitimate competitive
behavior then it will have negative consequences for consumers, and cable
operators alike.
In order to examine how section 623(d) should be applied in particular
instances, it is necessary to examine the economic circumstances under which
price discrimination is likely to occur and the reasons for its occurrence.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION
To establish the existence of economic price discrimination we examine the
ratio between the marginal costs of selling to different customers and the prices
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971)(real estate transactions not covered); Baum v. Investors
Diversified, Inc., 409 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1969)(mutual funds not covered); CBS, Inc. v. Amana
Refrigeration, Inc., 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 812 (1962)(television
advertising not covered).
22. See, e.g., Telescripps Cable Co. v. City of Glasgow, et al., C-88-0169-BG(M)(W.D. Ky.
1990); Rankin County Cablevision v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. et al, 692 F.Supp. 691
(S.D. Miss. 1988); H.R.M., Inc. v. Tele-communications, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 645 (D.C. Colo. 1987);
Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision of Virginia, Inc., 586
F.Supp. 973 (E.D. Va. 1982), aff'd, 714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1983).
23. Arguably, except where specifically authorized, the Cable Act does in fact free a cable
operator's pricing policies from all legal scrutiny by State and local officials. See 47 U.S.C. § 543
(1991).
24. See e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 6-2-103 (1991); FLA. STAT. ch. 540 (1991); WIs. STAT. § 133.04
(1991).
25. Examples of communities that have passed such ordinances include: Tifton, Georgia; Cape
Coral, Florida; Citrus County, Florida; Colorado Springs, Colorado; and Montgomery, Alabama.
26. See e.g., S. 12, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1880, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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those customers are charged. If the ratio between marginal cost and price is
different for different customers then there is an economic price discrimination. 27
For example, in the heavily regulated business of distributing electricity, economic
price discrimination is a standard practice. Regulators normally require that all
customers being served by a given electricity distribution system be charged the
same uniform "averaged" rate. 2 However, it is almost always true that the
marginal cost of serving some consumers of electricity is greater than for others.
The electric rates of those who are served at a high marginal cost are subsidized
by those who are served at lower cost. It is not practical to entirely avoid
economic price discrimination in the distribution of electricity and arguably it
may even serve some useful purposes. 29
In the legal context, the term "price discrimination" normally bears no
relationship to the economic concept just described.30 For legal purposes, price
discrimination can be said to exist whenever a firm offers the same product or
service at different prices to different customers. Thus, the common legal concept
of price discrimination involves only a difference in price without reference to
cost." However, the simple existence of price differences has historically not been
sufficient to establish misconduct or liability and the question of when, or
whether, firms should be allowed to maintain price differences has been the
subject of some controversy.
Price discrimination as an economic theory is premised on the belief that
each consumer places differing values on the products and services they purchase.
Consequently, different buyers would be willing to purchase a given product or
service at different pricing levels.12 Thus, by accurately identifying the pricing
points at which different consumers would purchase a product or service, a firm
could maximize its profits by selling to each consumer at the maximum price
that each consumer is willing to pay.33
27. The economic theory of price discrimination is well accepted. See e.g, RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 62 (1976).
28. Rate averaging is common to industries that require an extensive distribution network. For
example, garbage collection service is usually provided at a uniform rate even though there is
undoubtably a higher marginal cost associated with serving some customers than others. Another
example of rate averaging occurs in the business of delivering telephone service. See Manley Irwin,
The Communication Industry and The Policy of Competition, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 256, 261 (1964).
29. For example, in the absence of rate averaging some telephone users would be priced out of
the market. Reducing the numbers of persons who have telephone service reduces the utility of having
the service for the remaining subscribers. Arguably, all users of telephone service benefit by increased
subscribership, and this increase in the utility of the service justifies some rate discrimination. Even
if we assume no such benefit exists, in such service industries as telephone and electric service the
economic benefit to be gained by eliminating the subsidy paid by some users would be outweighed
by the increased administrative and regulatory cost of eliminating the discrimination. For additional
discussion of the social pros and cons of rate averaging see Bell, supra note 14, at 53 n.50.
30. It has been argued that the existence of economic price discrimination is strong evidence of
independent monopolization, POSNER, supra note 27, or collusion in oligopolistic markets. Richard
A. Posner, Oligopoly and The Antitrust Laws, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1578-79 (1969). Thus, while
it has no significant role in straight forward price discrimination cases, the concept of economic price
discrimination does have some application in cases brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act. 15
U.S.C §§ I and 2 (1973).
31. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960).
32. See POSNER, supra note 27, at 62.
33. [Tihe monopolist who is able to move down the demand curve from its highest point to its
intersection with the marginal cost curve, charging a different price for each sale according to the
strength of the customers desires for it, will obtain greater profits than the monopolist who charges
a single price. Id.
19931
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For the most part, this kind of "customer by customer" price discrimination
is confined to the retail sales of such large ticket items as automobiles and
appliances where the normal marketing practice is to encourage an intensive one-
on-one meeting between salesperson and consumer. For purposes of this discussion
I will distinguish these markets by describing them as "individual markets." Even
in these individual markets for large ticket items, the resulting discrimination is
imperfect because it relies on the seller's ability to accurately gauge the value
placed on the product by each individual consumer.14 The seller can only estimate.
Too high an estimate results in a lost sale; too low an estimate results in a failure
to maximize profits."5
In these "individual markets" the above factors tend to minimize the danger
that consumers as a group will suffer any injury from price discrimination. The
economic benefit to be gained by establishing a wide price spread between
individual consumers is counterbalanced by the risk of lost sales that would
accompany doing So.3 6 Measured over a period of time, for each instance in
which an individual consumer pays a higher price because a salesperson has
accurately gauged the maximum price a customer would be willing to pay, we
can speculate that there will be other instances in which the same consumer pays
a correspondingly lower price because of a salesperson's inaccurate determination.
Furthermore, assuming sufficient levels of competition exist, in the individual
markets for items such as automobiles and appliances consumers can to some
degree avoid the effects of price discrimination through market research and
comparison shopping.
Based on the forgoing it seems clear that the greatest danger of price gouging
and a resulting injury to consumers exists in what I will describe as "mass
markets," including markets for cable television services.
"Mass markets" are those in which the large scale production of a lower
priced product or service is followed by mass sales. Not all mass markets are
susceptible to effective discrimination. All other factors being equal, consumers
in a competitive market will purchase a product from the seller who offers it at
the lowest price.3 7 This is true whether we are dealing in an individual market
or a mass market. Thus, in mass markets, effective direct competition minimizes
opportunities for sellers to engage in effective price discrimination."
34. Id. at 64 ("[AII price discrimination . . . is imperfect.").
35. See id.
36. It has also been noted that in monopoly markets too large a price spread tends to encourage
entrepreneurial efforts to supplant the monopolist as well as encouraging legislation intended to curb
the monopolists pricing policies. Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 548, 558 (1969).
37. "Classical economic theory states that perfect competition is the most efficient and socially
desirable market result against which all other market results or market structures are measured.
Firms produce as much of their product as they are physically capable, and sell the product at their
marginal cost of production." Nicholas J. Pappas, Note, In Defense of Monopoly Cable Television
Franchising: Defining the First Amendment Rights of the Public and the Cable Operator Under the
Public Forum Doctrine and Natural Monopoly Theory, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 137,
209 (1987).
38. All other factors being equal, where a competing product is offered at a lower price and
can be easily substituted for the higher discriminatorily priced product, the potential customer will
purchase the substitute product. Anticipating that discrimination will result in lost sales and a
diminished ability to compete, the seller in a competitive market will not discriminate.
[Vol. 19:63
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In single seller mass markets, (non-competitive markets) while there is a
danger of supra-competitive pricing, (monopoly rents) the threat of injury to
consumers from price discrimination is, again, very limited. Because the mass
market seller deals in high volume sales, it is not economically feasible, as it is
in individual markets, for the seller to identify each consumer in advance of sale.
Nor is it usually possible to identify the maximum price each consumer would
be willing to pay. This inability to identify particular customers in advance or
to identify the maximum price that each customer would be willing to pay
imposes significant practical limitations on a firm's ability to engage in price
discrimination in mass markets. Consequently, firms that are in a business that
calls for a high sales volume of relatively lower priced products or services have
an incentive to engage in price discrimination only where there is a readily
identifiable group of people who would be willing to pay a higher price than
some other groups.
For example, telephone companies can easily distinguish commercial tele-
phone subscribers from other subscribers based on the obviously enhanced
economic benefit they derive from telephone service. Thus, telephone companies
have two readily identifiable classes of customers, one of whom would be willing
to pay a higher rate for telephone service than the other. The result is that
telephone companies can safely enhance profits by charging different (discrimi-
natory) rates to each of these two classes of customers.3 9
To summarize, price discrimination will only occur when there are two
readily identifiable groups of customers who would be willing to pay different
prices. In mass markets, this is most likely to occur when a firm faces differing
levels of competition in different locations. A firm can then be expected to charge
a higher price in areas where there is less competition and a lower price where
it faces greater competition.
This is precisely what happens in the overbuilt markets for cable television
services. When a system belonging to an incumbent operator is overbuilt by a
newly entering operator and the newly entering operator does not build out the
entire service area, the result is to create two easily distinguishable groups of
customers, one group being in the competitive area the other being in the non-
competitive area, who would be willing to pay different prices for cable service.
It is natural under these circumstances that the incumbent operator (which we
can assume hopes to maximize its profits) will charge the highest permissible
price in all of the areas where it offers service. The highest permissible price will
be higher in non-competitive areas than in areas where the incumbent faces direct
competition.4 Thus, the efficient, profit maximizing incumbent cable operator
will establish a territorial pricing policy based on the differing levels of competition
it faces in different areas. Absent any other factors that could be considered
anti-competitive the incumbent operator is behaving as should be expected in a
competitive market. It has lowered prices in response to competition - a desirable
39. The fact that higher rates for commercial users may be lawful, or otherwise justifiable, does
not alter the economic analysis of why such rate differences occur or the results that accrue from
those differences.
40. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
1993]
Journal of Legislation
result for consumers in those markets - and its conduct should be applauded,
not condemned.
IV. THE CLAYTON ACT
As previously discussed, an economic price discrimination occurs when, in
spite of differences in the cost of providing a product or service to different
customers, the product is sold to both at the same price.4' However, under the
Clayton Act "price discrimination" refers simply to a price difference. 42 Section
623(d) will probably be interpreted in the same manner. 4 Therefore, under section
623(d) in order to establish a prima facie case of illegal price discrimination by
a cable operator it would be necessary only to establish the existence of a
substantial price discrimination between competing purchasers over time." Thus,
while cable operators' territorial pricing policies are economically defensible, they
may expose the operator to charges of illegal price discrimination.
In recognition of the fact that under certain circumstances price discrimi-
nation might not result in any harm to competition but, rather, might be a
legitimate tool of competition, section 13(b) of the Clayton Act provides that:
[Niothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima facia case
thus made by showing that his lower price ... was made in a good faith to
meet an equally low price of a competitor.
The language of section 13(b) has come to be known as the "meeting
competition defense." Obviously the language of section 623(d) of the '92 Cable
Act differs substantially from that contained in the Clayton Act. Most significantly
it contains no explicit "meeting competition defense." However, three factors
contribute to the conclusion that such a provision would be implied. First, key
terms in section 623(d), such as "geographic area" are left undefined, or are
defined in such a way as to cast no light on how section 623 should be interpreted.
For example the definition for the term "cable system" is held over from the
1984 Cable Act. This definition, intended to distinguish between community
antenna television systems and other types of video delivery systems, is of no
use in interpreting section 623. Consequently the Court's will have great leeway
in how they interpret that provision. Second, an extensive body of case law has
developed under the Clayton Act, which contains an explicit meeting competition
defense. These decisions are the most readily available source of authority for
interpreting section 623(d). Third, to interpret section 623(d) in such a way as to
preclude meeting competition would fly in the face of conventional economic
theory. Barring one of two competitors from engaging in effective competition
would be logically inconsistent with one of the major purposes of the act which
is to promote competition.4 5
41. See POSNER, supra note 27, at 62 n.35.
42. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. at 549.
43. Court decisions interpreting the Clayton Act represent the most highly developed body of
law in this area and those decisions are undoubtably the first source Courts will turn to for guidance
in interpreting section 623(d).
44. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 45 (1948) (interpreting the Clayton Act).
45. The Act is after all, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992.
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Indeed, as will be discussed, there is sound reason to believe that a meeting
competition defense should be considered an implicit part of any legislation
intended to prevent price discrimination and it is possible that the constitution
requires that the defense of "meeting competition" be available. Consequently,
the Clayton Act remains the best model for examining the legality of incumbent
cable operators' territorial pricing policies.
Thus far, other than those decisions finding that cable television is a service
rather than a product, there have been few significant court decisions on price
discrimination in the cable television context"6, and none that have directly
addressed the availability of a meeting competition defense. However, there has
been at least one United States Supreme Court decision involving a case which
came to the court under circumstances similar to those commonly encountered
in cable overbuild situations.
In that case, Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc. 4 the
plaintiff, Vanco Beverage ("Vanco"), successfully sued Falls City Industries
("Falls City") for price discrimination under the Clayton Act because Falls City
had established a territorial pricing policy similar to the policies employed by
incumbent cable operators to compete with overbuilders. 4 The trial court's
decision in favor of Vanco was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit and Falls City petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for review.49 Both the District Court50 and the Circuit Court had concluded that
Falls City could not justify its conduct on the grounds that it was meeting
competition. 5
Vanco was the sole distributor of Falls City's beer in Vandenburgh County,
Indiana. 52 Vanco claimed that Falls City was engaged in illegal price discrimination
because Falls City sold its beer to a distributor in Henderson County, Kentucky
for a lower price than it charged Vanco. 51 While in a different state, Henderson
County, Kentucky was immediately adjacent to Vandenburgh County, Indiana.54
Vanco's claim of competitive injury was based on the fact that beer purchasers
would drive to neighboring Vandenburgh County to get the benefit of the lower
price being charged there. 5
46. There is one Federal decision that may have some remaining vitality. In Storer Cable
Communications v. The City of Montgomery, Case No. 90-T-958-N (M. Dist. Ala. Oct. 9, 1992), it
was necessary for the Court to decide whether a municipal uniform pricing ordinance was preempted
'under the 1984 Cable Act. The Court found that a portion of the ordinance directed at predatory
pricing was preempted because it attempted to regulate rates for basic cable service. Id. at 51-52.
However, after making note of the fact that 47 U.S.C. 202(a) prohibits price differences only where
they lack a "neutral, rational justification", id. at 50, the Court found that the portion of the
ordinance dealing with price discrimination was not preempted so long as it was interpreted in the
same manner as 47 U.S.C. § 202(a). Id. at 51. Also worthy of mention is Dunlap v. Colorado
Springs Cablevision, Inc., 799 P.2d 416 (Colo. App. 1990), discussed more fully, infra note 85,
which interprets the Colorado price discrimination statute in a manner favorable to incumbent cable
operators.
47. 460 U.S. 428 (1983).
48. See id. at 431-435.
49. Id. at 435.
50. Id. at 434-435.
51. Id. at 434.
52. Id. at 431.
53. Id. at 432.
54. Id. at 431.
55. Id. at 433.
1993]
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In examining the facts, the Supreme Court noted that the meeting competition
defense "requires the defendant to show only that its 'lower price was made in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor."' 5 6 Thus, the Court
found that if Falls City could demonstrate on remand that its lower Kentucky
prices were justified by different competitive pressures than existed in Indiana its
pricing policies would be protected by the meeting competition defense.
57
Significantly, the Court went on to point out that so long as they were set
in a good faith effort to meet competition, it did not matter whether the different
prices were also "set with the goal of increasing the seller's profits."" Thus, if
section 623(d) is interpreted to allow price differences, when made in a good
faith effort to meet competition, a cable operator's territorial pricing policy would
not be illegal even if the operator both lowers its price in competitive areas and
raises its price in non-competitive areas.59
The Court in Falls City Industries stated:
A seller need not choose between ruinously cutting its prices to all its customers
to match the price offered to one, and refusing to meet the competition and then
ruinously raising its prices to its remaining customers to cover increased unit
costs. Nor, need a seller choose between keeping all its prices ruinously low to
meet the price offered to one, and ruinously raising its prices to all customers
to a level significantly above that charged by its competitors. A seller is permitted
to retain a customer- by realistically meeting in good faith the price offered to
that customer, without necessarily changing the seller's price to its other custom-
ers.
Section 2(b) does not require a seller, meeting in good faith a competitors low
price to certain customers, to forgo the profits that otherwise would be available
in sales to its remaining customers. The very purpose of the [meeting competition]
defense is to permit a seller to treat different competitive situations differently.
The prudent businessman might well raise his prices to some customers to increase
his profits while meeting competitors' prices by keeping his prices to other
customers low.61
The Supreme Court's analysis in the Falls City decision represents more than
an effort to interpret the Clayton Act. Rather, what we see in this case is an
effort to distinguish between conduct that is undertaken in a legitimate effort to
56. Id. at 444.
57. Id. at 451.
58. Id. at 444.
59. In Falls City the District Court established that the price differences resulted not from a
reduction in price to the Kentucky distributor but because of increases in price to the Indiana
distributor. Id. at 434. The Circuit Court's conclusion that this alone was "sufficient" to defeat
Falls City's meeting competition defense, id. at 439, was specifically overruled. The Supreme Court
found that "the meeting competition defense requires the seller to justify only its lower price." Id.
at 442. Thus, in a price discrimination suit based on a cable operator's territorial pricing policy,
evidence of price increases in non-competitive areas would be irrelevant. "[Tihe prudent businessman
... might well raise his prices to some customers to increase his profits, while meeting competitors'
prices by keeping his prices to other customers low." Id. at 445.
60. The court noted elsewhere that the Act does not limit sellers' to reducing prices for the
purpose of retaining existing customers. Prices can also be lowered in an effort to meet the competition
for new customers. Id. at 446.
61. Id. at 444-45(citations omitted)(footnote added).
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compete and, thus, which should not be condemned, and conduct that is predatory
or culpable and which should not be tolerated.
Under this analysis it is evident that an incumbent cable operator who lowers
prices in only those areas where an overbuilder has introduced direct competition
is engaged in "meeting competition." This is natural competitive conduct that
one would expect in a healthy market. 62
Logically, since no direct competition exists in areas where the overbuilder
has elected not to construct a system the incumbent operator should be free in
those areas to leave prices as they were before competition was introduced in
other areas, or even raise prices if it chooses to do So. 63 The fact that price
differences exist for the purpose of maximizing profit, or even that prices might
be raised in non-competitive areas for the purpose of increasing profit, is
irrelevant.6 Indeed, if one believes that direct competition in the cable industry
is viable then such behavior might be considered laudable because, theoretically,
increasing prices in non-competitive areas will tempt others to introduce compe-
tition into those areas.
6
In the market for cable television services, reductions in price in competitive
areas should only be condemned, if at all, when the newly established prices are
clearly predatory.66
V. PREDATORY PRICING
Charges of price discrimination often arise in situations where a competitor
is charging prices that are below some measure of cost. Where the other necessary
elements of the charge are present, below cost pricing can be considered "pred-
atory" and a violation of the antitrust laws. It is also considered strong evidence
of the seller's intent in Clayton Act price discrimination cases. Evidence of a
predatory intent is significant to this discussion because, when demonstrated to
exist, it negates a defendant's argument that price differences were established in
order to meet competition.
62. The recent trend has been to interpret the federal price discrimination statute "[als a means
of enhancing price competition and increasing consumer welfare." CAIA A. HILLS, ANTITRUST
ADVISOR 274 (3d ed. 1985). However, because cable television is a natural monopoly, competition
cannot be promoted in a manner that is consistent with the goal of promoting consumer welfare.
Indeed, artificially promoting competition, as some municipalities have attempted in the cable television
market, runs the risk that upon the inevitable termination of competition the surviving competitor
will pass on the cost of the competition to consumers. This is sometimes described as "destructive
competition," see Pappas, supra note 37 at 213.
63. See Falls City Industries, 460 U.S. at 441.
64. Id. at 445.
65. Posner has noted that even in monopoly markets, "[iln the long run, a persistently very
large spread between price and cost may spur entrepreneurs to devise ingenious methods of challenging
or supplanting the monopolist and legislatures of curbing him." POSNER, supra note 27.
66. An inference that prices are low enough to be predatory should not be drawn too easily.
Since predatorily pricing its product would require a company to forgo profits for long enough to
drive competitors from the market, and thereafter maintain low prices for long enough to recover
losses and reap additional profit, true predatory pricing schemes are rare. See Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). Furthermore, the defendant might
well be able to establish other defenses to a charge of predation. It is also worth noting that once
established predatory pricing violates the antitrust laws. See id. Thus, one must question the need
for a charge of price discrimination based on evidence that prices are predatory.
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Courts have applied a variety of tests for determining whether prices are
predatory. In recent years, these tests have typically involved modest variations
on the now-famous test proposed by Areeda and Turner which establishes a
presumption of predation when prices are below marginal cost. 67 Because of the
difficulty of establishing when prices are below marginal cost, courts have
substituted average total cost as the proper legal measure for determining when
prices are predatory. 68 However, the economic structure of cable television makes
it no less difficult to establish any meaningful measure of average total cost than
it is to establish marginal cost.
In the cable television industry average total cost is a constantly declining
number. Thus, it would be difficult to establish the appropriate point in time
when average total cost should be measured for the purpose of determining when
prices are predatory. 69 Furthermore, because average total cost is constantly
declining, a cable operator may have a legitimate business justification for pricing
below average total cost that would be sufficient to overcome a presumption of
predatory pricing. 70 Thus, we can see that applying the usual predatory pricing
analysis to cable systems works an injustice. It would also have the economically
undesirable result of reducing production.
7
Any measure of average total cost applied to a cable system must include
customers who have not yet signed on for service but who will eventually do so.
To further demonstrate why this is so we examine what happens to average total
costs when a new cable system is constructed. The vast majority of costs associated
with cable television are fixed. That is, they remain the same regardless of the
67. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related practices Under Section
2 of The Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697, 716-18 (1975).
68. See, e.g., McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1496 (11th Cir. 1988)
(finding average total cost a proper measure and discussing the ways in which different courts have
applied the Areeda & Turner test).
69. An operator who has a current average total cost of five dollars per customer might well
reduce his rates to four dollars per customer in anticipation of signing up enough new subscribers
to reduce his average total cost below the 4 dollar level, thereby increasing overall profits. Under
traditional analysis, while this process is ongoing a presumption that prices are predatory arises.
Ironically, after enough subscribers have been connected to the system to reduce costs to below the
four dollar level a presumption arises that because prices are above average total cost they are not
predatory. In the context of an industry where costs are continually dropping this approach produces
wholly arbitrary results. Determinations of culpability are entirely dependent upon the time when one
applies the pricing analysis.
70. Supra note 67. It is not even clear that the burden would be on the defendant to establish
this point. In a predatory pricing case under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act a Plaintiff must
present evidence that tends to preclude any rational business explanation for the defendant's conduct
in order to avoid summary judgment. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 475 U.S. at 585-88. This
should also be true where predatory pricing serves as the basis of a complaint charging price
discrimination. See also William Inglis & Son Baking Co. v. I.T.T. Continental Baking Co., 668
F.2d 1014, 1035 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 825 (1982):
(If the defendants prices were below average total cost but above average variable cost, the plaintiff
bears the burden of showing that defendant's prices were predatory. If, however, the plaintiff proves
that the defendant's prices were below average variable cost, the plaintiff has established a prima
facia case of predatory pricing and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the prices were
justified.)
71. If a cable operator, by reducing prices to below average total cost in order to sign up new
customers, runs the risk of being charged with predatory pricing, he will be inhibited from lowering
prices. This will slow the rate at which new customers are signed onto the system; i.e., production
will be reduced.
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number of subscribers hooked up to the system. When construction of a new
system is first completed and only one customer has been connected to the system
all of the fixed costs associated with the system are directly attributable to that
one customer. Thus, if the system costs $100,000 to install, the average total cost
of serving all customers connected to the system - one - would be $100,000.
When a second subscriber connects to the system average total cost drops to
$50,000, and so on, until all potential customers have been served.
72
The principles discussed above could be applied to the early introductory
sales of any product regardless of the nature of the market. If measured during
the time period before full production is reached, per unit costs will always be
higher. However, natural monopoly markets like the market for cable television
service are unique in that average total costs continue to decline at all stages of
production. 73 Thus, even in cable television markets that are substantially devel-
oped it would not be inconsistent with sound marketing practice for an operator
to sell cable service at below average total cost in anticipation of increasing
subscribership, driving down average total costs, and ultimately reaping greater
total profits.
74
Furthermore, there are so many ambiguities regarding which competitor in
a cable overbuild situation should be considered the predator, 75 that it would be
unreasonable to apply traditional predatory pricing analysis to cable operators.
Given the widespread "good faith" belief 6 among cable operators, econo-
mists and other commentators, that cable television is a natural monopoly
enterprise, 77 even when price reductions are undertaken for the purpose of
deliberately driving an overbuilder out of the market, it is questionable whether
lowering prices should be condemned. Statistically, cable overbuilds are extremely
rare. Estimates vary but it appears that 99% of all cable television markets are
served by only one operator. 78 They are also generally short lived.7 9 Ultimately
one firm or the other tends to go out of business; often times, one company
purchases or merges with the other. 0 If the incumbent is operating under the
good faith perception that because of the industry's natural monopoly charac-
72. Obviously, no Court would sustain a claim of predatory pricing against a cable operator
based on calculations that were developed from these early stages of production. As an economic
matter, to do so would deter all new entry. It has also been noted in discussing tertiary line cases
under the Clayton Act that where a "seller's discriminatory pricing occurs in conjunction with its
entry into a market" it would be difficult to establish competitive injury. HnLs, supra note 62, at
268.
73. Pappas, supra note 37, at 214.
74. "[Uintil a company serves the whole market it will have an incentive to keep expanding in
order to lower its average costs." Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d
119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982).
75. See supra note 27.
76. See Falls City Industries, Inc., 460 U.S. at 451 (pricing differences justified only where made
in "good faith").
77. See supra note II.
78. See, e.g., Senate Hearings supra note 4, at 7 (Opening Statement of Senator Gorton).
79. See Metro Dade Report, supra note 8.
80. See Metro Dade Report, supra note 8. An excellent example of typical results from a cable
overbuild is described by the court in Cable Alabama Corporation v. City of Huntsville, 768 F.
Supp. 1484 (N.D. Ala. 1991). The court estimated that the two competing companies in that case
sustained $25 million in losses over a three year period before reaching an agreement that called for
the incumbent operator, Comcast, to buy out the overbuilder, Cable Alabama.
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teristics only one cable firm can survive within a given geographic market, the
incumbent can hardly be faulted for seeking to ensure that it is the survivor.
"[A] prudent businessman responding fairly to what he reasonably believes are
the competitive necessities" should not be punished for doing so."'
Assuming that the overbuilder entered the. market with knowledge of the
natural monopoly situation, it must necessarily have been operating under the
belief that it would be able to drive the incumbent from the market.12 Under
these circumstances, perhaps it is the overbuilder, however misguided, who
engaged in predatory conduct by electing to enter the natural monopoly market.
VI. CONCLUSION
Absent the defense of meeting competition, the application of section 623(d)
of the '92 Cable Act to overbuilt cable television markets would have the effect
of outlawing legitimate competition. 3 Even though section 623(d) does not
explicitly incorporate a meeting competition defense, any court addressing the
issue should, and probably would, find that such a defense is implicit84 or would
otherwise avoid reading the ordinance in such a way as to proscribe legitimate
competitive conduct.85 As the Supreme Court noted in the Falls City decision,
"[tierritorial pricing, . . . can be a perfectly reasonable method-sometimes the
most reasonable method-of responding to rivals' low prices."
'8 6
Furthermore, because this is the case, and because section 623(d) does not
apply equally to both cable competitors, it may lack the fundamental fairness
that is required under the Federal Constitution.
7
81. Falls City Industries, Inc., 460 U.S. at 450.
82. "If the prospective entrant realizes there is room for only one firm in the market it will not
enter unless confident of being able to supplant the existing monopolist." Posner, supra note 36, at
611-612.
83. "It would be very difficult to draft a decree forbidding systematic price discrimination that
did not constrain or inhibit legitimate pricing behavior as well." POSNER, supra note 27, at 65.
84. Implying the existence of a meeting competition defense would have a narrower result than
would most of a Court's other options. For example, finding Section 623(d) unconstitutional would
altogether forbid its future application, whereas, imposing a meeting competition defense would allow
future applications under appropriate circumstances. Furthermore, there is some precedent for the
Courts to follow in implying a meeting competition defense. Section 202(a) of the Communications
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1992), states in pertinent part that "[iut shall be unlawful for any common
carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges .. .directly or indirectly, by
any means or device .. " This section contains no explicit meeting competition defense. However,
it has been interpreted so as to allow common carriers to raise the defense that discriminations are
justified by "competitive necessity." See American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. FCC, 663 F.2d
133, 139 (1980)(competitive necessity to be raised in the context of determining whether discrimination
is unjust or unreasonable), citing, Western Union International, Inc. v. FCC, 568 F.2d 1012, 1019
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); American Telephone & Telegraph Co., (Tariff FCC
No. 267), 62 F.C.C.2d 774(1977); American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Hi/Lo), 55 F.C.C.2d. 225
(1975), aff'd mem. sub nom., Commodity News Service, Inc. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 1021 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
85. There are several other alternative means besides "implying" a meeting competition defense
that a court could employ to avoid an anti-competitive result. Indeed, one of the few state courts to
address the issue of territorial pricing in cable services found that neither a local cable pricing
ordinance, nor, the Colorado Price Discrimination Statute precluded territorial pricing by Cable
operators. Dunlap v. Colorado Springs Cablevision, Inc., 799 P.2d. 416 (Colo. App. 1990). In
avoiding a decision against the defendant cable operator the court found, inter alia, that the plaintiffs
(residents of a non-competitive area) had suffered no injury from paying more for cable services. Id.
at 417.
86. Falls City Industries, Inc., 460 U.S. at 450.
87. It is well established that, even independent of any ordinance or law, governments have an
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It is highly questionable whether direct competition in cable television is the
panacea that some public officials once perceived it to be. s Until such time as
steps are taken to change the fundamental structure of the cable industry 9 there
will always be some question about whether cable services are fairly priced. In
the interim, establishing and enforcing price discrimination rules in a punitive
manner would only work an injustice. Other aspects of the '92 Cable Act will
undoubtably be revisited within the next year or two. Congress should also revisit
section 623(d) to incorporate an explicit meeting competition defense. Until that
occurs cable operators and consumers will have to rely on the courts to read
justice into the new law. In those communities where attempted cable overbuilds
are underway, city officials and others would be wise to examine the incumbent
operator's territorial pricing policies under the light of case law construing the
Clayton Act to determine whether the operator's conduct is truly culpable before
pursuing enforcement
obligation to treat all similarly situated persons the same. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373
(1886)(even an ordinance "fair on its face and impartial in appearance" can be applied so as to
deny equal protection). This principal is true of all activities a city seeks to regulate but because
cable television implicates First Amendment interests, equal protection claims by cable television
operators receive a heightened level of review. Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United
States, 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985). After determining that it should have two cable operators a
City is obligated to treat both operators equally. Cities cannot discriminate between First Amendment
speakers. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers Project Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Grosjean v. American Press
Company, 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
88. See e.g., Neil W. Hamilton & Anne M. Caulfield, The Defense of Natural Monopoly in
Sherman Act Monopolization Cases, 33 DEPAut. L. Rv. 466 (1984) ("Under natural monopoly
conditions competition cannot regulate the market because inevitably only one firm will survive.").
Posner, supra note 36, ("Competition is thus not a viable regulatory mechanism under conditions of
natural monopoly.")
89. See e.g., Bell supra note 14 (suggesting "unbundling" cable programming from the cable
grid for regulatory purposes as a possible solution to many of the problems that plague the industry).

